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FEDERAL ASSET FORFEITURE REFORM
INTRODUCTION: THE ANCIENT ROOTS OF
MODERN FORFEITURE LAW
Jimmy Guruli
MR. TUNELL: Thank you very much everyone for showing up this early in the morn-
ing. I am Bill Tunell, the Symposium Editor here at the Journal of Legislation. We are
very pleased to be presenting a symposium here on a very important and timely issue,
one of the most "hot" and current issues in the law, and that is forfeiture law: particu-
larly, Federal Asset Forfeiture law. We have a very distinguished panel, which I won't
introduce, leaving that distinction to our moderator for this event. But as Symposium
Editor, it is my honor to be able to introduce our moderator this morning. He is law
school Professor Jimmy Gurul6. Professor Giruld has been a member of the faculty at
the law school since 1992. Prior to that, he has had extensive experience as an Assis-
tant Attorney General in Los Angeles. As Assistant Attorney General, he has received
numerous awards including the Edmund Randolph Award-given by the Attorney
General-the Attorney General's Distinguished Service Award, and' the Attorney
General's Award for Excellence in Management. He has also received the DEA's
Administrative Award, which is the highest award given by the DEA. More important-
ly, on the Asset Forfeiture issue, we are pleased to have Professor Gurul6 moderating
for us because he has recently been appointed advisor to the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee. In particular, he will be advising Senator Orrin Hatch on several issues including
Asset Forfeiture and the recent legislative reform proposals that are in Congress. So,
he will be of major importance in the federal legislation on this matter. We are very
impressed and very thankful to have him moderating for us today. With that said, I
would like to introduce to you, our own Professor Jimmy Gurul6.
PROFESSOR GuRuLt: Let me also welcome the panelists who have travelled from coast
to coast to join us here this morning. I think that we are going to see students coming
and going today .... Before I introduce the panelists and ask them to come up to the
podium to make their respective presentations, let me take a few minutes to set the
stage, if I might. I would like to provide us with some general background information
regarding civil forfeiture in an attempt to frame the controversy that has swirled
around civil asset forfeiture, specifically as a result of a number of recent Supreme
Court decisions that have been handed down in the past two to three terms of the
Court. I would like to discuss those decisions, and then set out which aspects of forfei-
ture law have been settled, and which aspects still need to be expounded upon-either
by the legislature or by the Supreme Court. I dare say that the members of our panel
will have a great deal to say-one way or another-about how these issues ultimately
are resolved. But in order to appreciate their comments, let me provide some back-
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ground.
I. THE ANCIENT ROOTS OF MODERN FORFEITURE LAW
Civil forfeiture is one of the most potent weapons in the prosecutor's armamen-
tarium in the "war on drugs" and traditional organized crime.' Like criminal forfeiture,
the principal object of civil forfeiture is to strike at the economic power base of crimi-
nal enterprises and deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gains.2 However, unlike
criminal forfeiture which is an in personam proceeding, civil forfeiture is an action in
rem. Civil forfeiture perpetuates the legal fiction that "property used in violation of law
[is] itself the wrongdoer that must be held to account for the harms it ha[s] caused."3
In a civil action, the property, or res, is considered the "offender. '4 "It is the illegal
use that is the material consideration, it is that which works the forfeiture, the guilt or
innocence of its owner being accidental."5 Thus, the defendant is the property rather
than the property owner.6 The in rem proceeding stands independent of any criminal
prosecution in personam.7 It is therefore immaterial whether the person whose conduct
gave rise to the forfeiture is indicted or convicted of the underlying predicate offense
A criminal conviction is not a condition precedent to sustaining a judgment of civil
forfeiture.
The conceptual underpinnings of civil forfeiture can be traced back to English
common law. Three kinds of forfeiture have been recognized historically: "deodand,"
forfeiture upon conviction for a felony or treason, and statutory forfeiture.9 At com-
mon law, the value of an inanimate object that directly or indirectly caused the acci-
dental death of a King's subject was forfeited to the Crown as a deodand.' It was
assumed that the value of the instrument forfeited to the King would be used to pro-
1. See United States v. Daccaret, 6 F.3d 37, 46 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Two Tracts of
Real Property, 998 F.2d 204, 213 (4th Cir. 1993) ("One of the most potent weapons in the
government's war on drugs is its ability to obtain the civil forfeiture of property that aids violations of
the drug laws."); United States v. 384-390 West Broadway, 964 F.2d 1244, 1248 (1st Cir. 1992).
2. The legislative intent in enacting civil forfeiture for felony drug violations is clear. Congress
expressed the purpose of forfeiture as follows:
[IThe conviction of individual racketeers and drug dealers [is] of only limited effective-
ness if the economic power bases of criminal organizations or enterprises [are] left in-
tact .... Today, few in the Congress or the law enforcement community fail to recog-
nize that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to
deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs which, with its inevi-
table attendant violence, is plaguing the country. Clearly, if law enforcement efforts to
combat racketeering and drug trafficking are to be successful, they must include an at-
tack on the economic aspects of this crime. Forfeiture is the mechanism through which
such an attack may be made.
S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374.
3. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1135 (1993).
4. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2808-09 (1993); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
5. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 513.
6. The owner of the property is often referred to as the "claimant."
7. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 16 (1827); Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96
U.S. 395, 400 (1877) ("[Tlhe thing in such a case is primarily considered as the offender, or rather
that the offence is attached primarily to the thing.")
8. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); United States v.
One Parcel of Real Estate, 906 F.2d 110, 112 (4th Cir. 1990).
9. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1974).
10. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81.
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vide Masses for the good of the dead man's soul, or otherwise put to a charitable
use."1
The second kind of common law forfeiture resulted from conviction for a felony
or treason. "The convicted felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and his lands
escheated to his lord; the convicted traitor forfeited all of his property, real and person,
to the Crown."' 2 These forfeitures were commonly referred to as forfeitures of es-
tate. 3 The rationale for forfeiture in this instance was that a breach of the criminal
law was an offense to the King's peace, which justified the denial of the right to own
property." Finally, the common law "provided for statutory forfeitures of offending
objects used in violation of the customs and revenue laws."' 5 The most notable of
these were the Navigation Acts of 1660 which required that most commodities be
shipped in English vessels. A violation of the Act resulted in the forfeiture of the
illegally carried goods as well as the ship used to transport them. 6 Forfeiture under
the Navigation Acts was justified as a penalty for negligence. The owner of the vessel
was held accountable for the wrongdoing of the ship's master and the cargo carried on
board.'
7
Of these three kinds of forfeiture under English common law, only statutory
forfeiture is recognized in the United States. "Deodands did not become part of the
common-law tradition of this country."' 9 Additionally, the Constitution forbids forfei-
ture of estate as a punishment for treason "except during the Life of the Person attaint-
ed."2 Moreover, "[t]he First Congress abolished forfeiture of estate as punishment for
felons."'"
II. FEDERAL FORFEITURE STATUTES
Civil forfeiture as a weapon against illicit narcotics trafficking was first enacted
into legislation as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970 ("Act").22 Originally, the statute was limited in scope and authorized forfei-
ture of only the illegal substances themselves, the instruments by which they were
manufactured and distributed, and conveyances used to transport, or in any manner,
11. Id.
12. Id. at 682.
13. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806-07; 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries, at 381.
14. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
15. Id.
16. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807; see generally L. Harper, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS
(1939). Additionally, when a ship was engaged in acts of "piratical aggression," it was subject to
confiscation and forfeiture. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 8 (1827). Congress subsequently
enacted legislation authorizing the forfeiture of distilleries and other property used to defraud the Unit-
ed States of tax revenues from the sale of alcoholic beverages. See United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S.
1, 11-12 (1890).
17. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807.
18. Almost immediately after adoption of the Constitution, ships and cargoes involved in customs
offenses were made subject to federal forfeitures, as well as vessels used to deliver slaves to foreign
countries and to this country. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683. Today, forfeiture is authorized by more
than 100 federal statutes. See Anthony J. Franze, Note, Casualties of War?: Drugs, Civil Forfeiture,
and the Plight of the "Innocent Owner," 70 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 369, 376-77 (1994).
19. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
20. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
21. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807 (citing the Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117).
22. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970), (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
881 (1988)).
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facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of illegal con-
trolled substances. 3 In 1978, Congress amended the Act and expanded the reach of
civil forfeiture to authorize the seizure of proceeds derived from illegal drug deal-
ing."' Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), money is subject to forfeiture if it was: "(1) fur-
nished or intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance; (2) traceable
to such an exchange; or (3) used or intended to be used to facilitate a violation of
federal drug laws."25 The 1978 amendments also provided for an "innocent owner"
defense.26
The Act was amended once again when Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984 ("CFA").27 The CFA is significant in two respects. First, it
authorized forfeiture of real property for the first time. The CFA added section
881(a)(7), which permits the forfeiture of all real property which is used, or intended
to be used to commit or facilitate the commission of a federal narcotics felony.2" Sec-
23. The Act provided:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right
shall exist in them:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or
acquired in violation of this title.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or in-
tended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or
exporting any controlled substance in violation of this title.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property de-
scribed in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or in-
tended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale,
receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1) or
(2) ....
(5) All books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data
which are used, or intended for use, in violation of this title.
Id. § 511(a).
24. Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 92 Stat. 3768, 3777, (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881), provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished
or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in
violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all mon-
eys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate
any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omis-
sion established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowl-
edge or consent of that owner.
25. United States v. $30,060.00 in U.S. Currency, 39 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting
United States v. $191,910 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1071 (9th Cir. 1994)).
26. The "innocent owner" defense provides an exception to the forfeiture of property described in
the Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 92 Stat. 3768, 3777 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)). The statute reads as follows:
[N]o property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an
owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been com-
mitted or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993), where the Supreme Court
sets forth an excellent analysis of the contours of the "innocent owner" defense.
27. Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2050 (1984).
28. See United States v. Real Estate Known as 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir.
1990) ("By omitting real estate from § 881(a), Congress had inadvertently left a wide range of proper-
ty used to facilitate commerce in illegal drugs outside of its reach."). Section 881(a)(7) provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
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ond, the CFA codified the so-called "relation-back" doctrine which provides that all
right, title, and interest in property described in § 881(a) shall vest in the United States
upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture.29
The majority of drug-related civil forfeiture actions are filed under either of three
subsections of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a). Section 881(a)(4) authorizes the forfeiture of con-
veyances used, or intended to be used, to facilitate the commission of a narcotics felo-
ny. Illicit proceeds traceable to the commission of a felony drug offense are forfeitable
under § 881(a)(6). Finally, the forfeiture of real property used, or intended to be used,
to facilitate the commission of a drug felony is permitted under § 881(a)(7).
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 also authorizes civil forfeiture.30
Section 981(a)(1), of Title 18, United States Code, provides for civil forfeiture of any
property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in viola-
tion of any of the following statutes: Title 31, United States Code, § 5313(a) (failure to
file a currency transaction report); § 5324(a) (structuring a transaction to evade the
reporting requirements); Title 18, U. S. C., § 1956 (the domestic money laundering
provision); or § 1957 (the international money laundering statute).3
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Although civil forfeiture is an invaluable prosecution tool, it is not without its
critics and detractors. The opponents of civil forfeiture maintain that it is abused by
law enforcement, which has a vested interest in the property forfeited. The proceeds of
forfeited assets are often distributed to law enforcement agencies through the Federal
Asset Forfeiture Fund.32 In many cases, forfeiture provides a needed budgetary sup-
plement to law enforcement agencies. Moreover, criticism is directed at the fact that
the government is not required to meet the more demanding criminal standard of "be-
yond a reasonable doubt." Instead, civil forfeiture only requires a showing of "probable
cause" that the subject property was used for, or derived from, a prohibited purpose. In
a civil forfeiture proceeding, "the government bears the initial burden of establishing
probable cause to connect the property to be forfeited with some form of criminal
wrongdoing."33
right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improve-
ments, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or
to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more
than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission
established by that owner, to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge
or consent of that owner.
29. 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988).
30. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 981.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). See United States v. 1988 Oldsmobile Cutlass
Supreme, 983 F.2d 670, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Dollar Bank Money Mkt. Account,
980 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. $448,342.85, 969 F.2d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1992).
32. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1613(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing the Customs Forfeiture
Fund);; 21 U.S.C. § 1509 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing the National Drug Control Policy's
Special Forfeiture Fund); 28 U.S.C. § 524(1) (Supp. V 1993) (establishing the U.S. Department of
Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund).
33. United States v. Eighty-Seven Thousand Sixty Dollars, 23 F.3d 1352, 1354 (8th Cir. 1994);
see also United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The
standard for probable cause in forfeiture proceedings resembles that required to support a search
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Two bills have been introduced to Congress seeking major legislative reform. A
House bill introduced by Congressman Henry Hyde [R-IL], ("Hyde Bill"), is directed
at, among other things, amending the "innocent owner" defense.34 The Hyde Bill
seeks to avail the defense to an owner who was either without knowledge, or did not
consent to the illegal conduct giving rise to forfeiture. This would resolve a current
split in the circuits concerning whether a claimant must prove both that the illegal use
of the property occurred without the owner's knowledge and without his consent.35 It
also authorizes the district court to appoint counsel for indigent claimants. Perhaps
more importantly, it seeks to enhance the standard needed for the government to sus-
tain a forfeiture from the current probable cause to a "clear and convincing" stan-
dard.36 Finally, the American Civil Liberties Union and National Association of Crim-
inal Defense Lawyers have joined Congressman Hyde in seeking major legislative
changes to the forfeiture laws.
A second bill introduced by Congressman John Conyers [D-MI], ("Conyers
Bill"), is much more ambitious.37 It proposes sweeping changes that would in effect
dismantle civil forfeiture. The Conyers Bill would mandate that forfeiture proceedings
be conducted only upon the conviction of the property owner for the relevant crime.
Accordingly, a criminal conviction would be a necessary precondition to civil forfei-
ture. It would also require the government to show by "clear and convincing evidence"
that the property was subject to forfeiture. In addition, claimants unable to afford legal
representation would receive court-appointed counsel. The right to a jury trial would
also be extended to civil forfeiture proceedings. Furthermore, bona fide attorney's fees
would be exempted from forfeiture and the value of forfeited property would be limit-
ed so as not to exceed the pecuniary gain derived by the wrongdoer from the of-
fense.3"
warrant. The determination of probable cause is based upon a totality of circumstances test and the
government's evidence must be more than that which gives rise to a mere suspicion, although it need
not rise to the level of prima facie proof.") (citations omitted); United States v. 255 Broadway, 9 F.3d
1000, 1003 (lst Cir. 1993); United States v. 785 St. Nicholas Ave. and 789 St. Nicholas Ave., 983
F.2d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2349 (1993); United States v. 6250 Ledge Rd.,
943 F.2d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 1991).
34. See H.R. 2417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (entitled the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act).
35. Several circuits have adopted a disjunctive reading of the "innocent owner" defense requiring
that the claimant demonstrate that the illegal use of the property occurred either without his knowledge
or without his consent, not both. See United States v. 77 Walnut St., 923 F.2d 840 (1st Cir. 1990)
(unpublished opinion), (claimant raising innocent owner defense under § 881(a)(7) entitled to judgment
by proving "that the illegal use of the property occurred either without her knowledge or without
consent."); United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1109 (1991), ("We conclude that a claimant may avoid forfeiture by establishing either that he had no
knowledge of the narcotics activity or, if he had knowledge, that he did not consent to it."); United
States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 624 (3d Cir. 1989) ("knowledge of the illegal usage does
not deprive the owner of an interest when the owner can demonstrate the property was used without
her consent"); United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1503 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1992)
("[E]ither ignorance or non-consent is sufficient to make out an innocent owner defense."). The Ninth
Circuit is the only circuit to embrace the conjunctive interpretation. The Ninth Circuit would require
the claimant to prove both lack of knowledge and lack of consent. See United States v. Lot 11I-B,
Tax Map Key 4-4-03-71(4), 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
36. George Fishman, Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform: The Agenda Before Congress, 39 N.Y. Law
School L. Rev. 121 (1994).
37. See H.R.3347, 103d Cong., 1st Sess (1994) (entitled the Asset Forfeiture Justice Act).
38. In contrast, the Department of Justice has recently completed drafting the Forfeiture Act of
1995. Their bill would substantially strengthen federal civil forfeiture by attempting to resolve many of
the ambiguities created by recent Supreme Court decisions and addressing many legal issues that have
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IV. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
ON CIVIL FORFEITURE
A. The Double Jeopardy Dilemma
While Congress has been actively re-examining the civil forfeiture laws, the
United States Supreme Court has not stood silent on the subject. During the last three
terms of the Court, it has issued several major civil forfeiture decisions, of which two
have substantially restricted the use of civil forfeiture.39 In Austin v. United States, the
Supreme Court pierced the legal fiction of in rem forfeitures and held that civil forfei-
ture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is punitive in nature and, therefore, subject to the
constraints of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.' The defendant,
Austin, was convicted in state court for possessing two grams of cocaine with the
intent to distribute. Following his conviction, the United States filed an in rem action
seeking forfeiture of his mobile home and auto body shop, the locations of the drug
transaction which led to his conviction." Austin argued that the forfeiture of his mo-
bile home and auto body shop would violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against excessive fines. The district court rejected the excessive fines argument and
entered summary judgment for the government.42 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the
conviction.
The Supreme Court, reversing the Eighth Circuit, concluded that the forfeiture
constituted punishment and reasoned that the Eighth Amendment, unlike other amend-
ments, does not contain language expressly limiting itself to criminal cases.43 The
Court noted that the purpose of the Eighth Amendment is to limit the government's
power to punish. Thus, the Court stated that the dispositive question is not whether the
forfeiture provisions are characterized as criminal or civil, but whether the forfeiture
served in part to punish." If so, civil forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is limit-
ed by the Excessive Fines Clause.
The Supreme Court proceeded to analyze whether civil forfeiture was considered,
to serve in part to punish, at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified. The Court
also questioned whether forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) should be construed
as imposing punishment today. After engaging in an historical review of civil forfei-
ture, the Court concluded that even though the "innocence" of the owner could not
divided the federal circuits. For example, the DOJ's proposed legislation would reform the innocent
owner defense requiring the claimant to prove both that he lacked knowledge of the illegal use of the
property and that the property was used without his consent. The proposed legislation would also
provide for a uniform definition of "innocent owner," eliminating the "willful blindness" requirement
found in certain civil forfeiture provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988).
39. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (holding that forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) con-
stitutes punishment and, thus, are limited by the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment); 92
Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (holding that to qualify as an "innocent owner," the claim-
ant need not be a bona fide purchaser for value and that the "innocent owner" defense trumps the
relation-back doctrine); see also United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492
(1993) (holding that the owner is entitled to a pre-seizure hearing when the government seeks to for-
feit real property).
40. 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
41. Id. at 2803.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2805-06.
44. Id. at 2806.
1995]
Journal of Legislation
serve as a common-law defense, forfeiture consistently has been recognized as serving,
at least in part, the goal of punishing and deterring the owner. 5
The Court next considered whether the forfeiture statutes at issue are properly
considered punishment today. Three reasons were advanced in support of the conclu-
sion that §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are properly considered punishment. First, the Court
reasoned that the forfeiture provisions expressly provide an "innocent owner" defense
which serves to focus on the culpability of the owner.' From this, the Court inferred
a "congressional intent to punish only those involved in drug trafficking. '47 Second,
the Court noted that the congressional intent was to tie the availability of civil forfei-
ture directly to the commission of drug offenses. Third, the legislative history reveals
that Congress intended forfeiture to serve as "a powerful deterrent" or punishment
against those dealing in illicit drugs.' In enacting § 881(a)(7) in 1984, Congress rec-
ognized "that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inade-
quate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs."'49
Finally, the Court rejected the government's arguments that the civil forfeiture
provisions should be considered remedial in nature, rather than punitive. The Court
found an insufficient nexus between the value of the forfeited property and any damag-
es sustained by the government. The Court commented that the "forfeiture of proper-
ty... [is] a penalty that ha[s] absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by
society or to the cost of enforcing the law."5° Even assuming that §§ 881(a)(4) and
(a)(7) serve some remedial purpose, the Court stated that the Government's argument
must fail because "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term."'" Therefore, ab-
sent a purpose that is solely remedial in nature, the Court concluded that civil forfei-
ture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) cannot properly be characterized as a civil sanction.
Since the forfeiture of the property constitutes punishment, the Court held that the
provisions are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.52
45. Id. at 2810; see also Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 686 (forfeiture serves "punitive and deterrent
purposes").
46. Id. at 2810-11.
47. Id. at 2811.
48. Id. at 2811 (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 195 (1983)).
49. Id. at 2811 (quoting S. Rep. 98-225, at 191 (1983)).
50. Id. at 2812 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980)).
51. Id. at 2812 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
52. The Supreme Court in Austin side-stepped and left to the lower courts what test to be applied
and factors to be considered in determining whether the forfeiture in a given case is constitutionally
disproportionate. Id. at 2812. This issue has since divided the federal courts. The federal circuits that
have addressed the issue have adopted either an instrumentality or proportionality test, or a hybrid test
of the two. See United States v. Real Property Located in El Dorado County, 59 F. 3d 974 (9th Cir.
1995) (adopting a hybrid instrumentality/proportionality test for civil forfeiture.) United States v. Chan-
dler, 36 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (1995), (in adopting an instru-
mentality test the court held that the question of excessiveness for in rem forfeiture is directly tied to
the "guilt of the property" or the extent to which it was involved in drug activity, not its value);
United States v. 9638 Chicago Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1994) (expressly rejecting the
instrumentality test in favor of a broader analysis taking into consideration the monetary value of the
property, the extent of criminal activity associated with the property, the fact that the property was a
residence, and the effect on innocent occupants of the residence); United States v. 38 Whalers Cove
Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992), (applying a proportional-
ity analysis which takes into consideration: (1) the inherent gravity of the offense; (2) the sentences
imposed for similarly grave offenses in the same jurisdiction; and (3) sentences imposed for the same
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The Supreme Court's holding in Austin, has generated a firestorm of judicial
controversy. In light of its decisions in United States v. Halper and Department of
Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,54the central question is whether a criminal pros-
ecution following a judgment of civil forfeiture for the underlying offense which gave
rise to forfeiture violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Con-
versely, protections afforded under the Double Jeopardy Clause are implicated where a
civil forfeiture action is filed after a criminal prosecution. At least three divergent
views have emerged on the double jeopardy issue.
1. Single vs. Multiple Proceedings
The Second and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the position that the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not violated where the civil forfeiture suit and the criminal prosecu-
tion constitute a single prosecution against the defendant-claimant. In United States v.
Millan, the defendant was indicted for conspiracy to distribute "massive amounts of
heroin."5 The government thereafter filed an in rem forfeiture action against certain
property, including bank accounts claimed by the defendant. The defendant entered
into a stipulation on the assets subject to civil forfeiture and the civil suit was subse-
quently dismissed.56 Before the start of the criminal trial, the defendant filed a motion
to dismiss the criminal charges on double jeopardy grounds. The district court dis-
missed the motion and the defendant was convicted at trial on the drug charges.
In affirming the judgment of the district court denying the motion to dismiss, the
Second Circuit recounted that multiple punishments arising from a single proceeding
fall outside the scope of the Supreme Court's decision in Halper. The Court posited
that "it is well-established that Congress may impose multiple punishments for a single
crime without violating the Constitution's double jeopardy restrictions."57 The Second
Circuit defined the threshold issue as whether the civil forfeiture suit was part of "a
single, coordinated prosecution" of persons involved in criminal activity."s If so, the
crime in other jurisdictions); United States v. RR No. 1 Box 224, 14 F.3d 864 (3d Cir. 1994) (adopt-
ing a proportionality test for excessiveness); United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1498-
99 (lth Cir. 1994) (while failing to articulate a precise test for excessiveness, the court appears to
have engaged in some sort of proportionality analysis in finding the forfeiture of a home valued at
$150,000, in comparison to the gambling activity that took place at the residence, unconstitutionally
excessive).
53. 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989). In Halper, the defendant was convicted of submitting 65 false
claims for government reimbursement for providing medical services for patients eligible for Medicare
benefits. The defendant was convicted under the criminal false claims statute and sentenced to prison
and f'ied $5,000. The government then filed a civil action against the defendant under the federal
civil False Claims Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government and
imposed a civil penalty of $2,000 on each of the 65 false claims totaling $130,000. The actual loss to
the government was $16,000. The Supreme Court held that the civil sanction of $130,000 bore no
"rational relation" to the sum of the government's actual loss plus its costs in investigating and prose-
cuting the false claims and, thus, constituted punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
54. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) (striking down a state of Montana drug tax imposed after a criminal
conviction, finding that it constituted a second punishment for the same drug offense in violation of
the defendant's protection against double jeopardy).
55. 2 F.3d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
56. Pursuant to the stipulation, the government agreed to release $101,000 in cash, as well as,
other real and personal assets in order to enable defendant to pay attorneys' fees. In return, the defen-
dant agreed to forfeit certain properties-including $236,804.48 in bank deposits, two parcels of real
estate, and two business interests-to the government. Id. at 19.
57. Id. at 20.
58. Id.
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defendant's double jeopardy rights would not be offended by the imposition of multi-
ple punishment in a single prosecution. The Court concluded that the civil and criminal
proceedings constituted "a single, coordinated prosecution", relying on the following
factors:
In the instant case warrants for the civil seizures and criminal arrests were issued
on the same day, by the same judge, based on the same affidavit by the DEA
agent .... Furthermore, the civil complaint incorporated the criminal indictment.
Finally, the [defendants] were aware of the criminal charges against them when
they entered into the Stipulation."
Given these circumstances, the Second Circuit reached the conclusion that the civil and
criminal actions were simply different prongs of a single prosecution. Additionally, the
Court recognized the concern raised in Halper, that the government might be abusively
seeking the second punishment because it was dissatisfied with the punishment im-
posed in the first proceeding. The court held that this was not present in the instant
case because the civil and criminal proceedings were contemporaneous and not consec-
utive.'
In United States v. 18755 North Bay Road,6 the Eleventh Circuit reached the
same conclusion as Millan. Citing the Second Circuit's decision in Millan with approv-
al, the Eleventh Circuit opined that "the circumstances of the simultaneous pursuit by
the government of criminal and civil sanctions ... falls within the contours of a sin-
gle, coordinated prosecution."62 The Court also found no evidence that the govern-
ment was seeking a second punishment because it was dissatisfied with the punishment
levied in the criminal prosecution.63
2. The Drug Proceeds Exception
In United States v. Tilley, the Fifth Circuit recognized a "drug proceeds" excep-
tion to the double jeopardy prohibition.' In Tilley, defendants sought dismissal of
criminal charges, arguing that the prior civil forfeiture of $650,000 in proceeds from
illicit drug sales constituted punishment and any additional criminal punishment would
violate protections afforded under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed, holding that the civil forfeiture of drug profits is remedial in nature, not puni-
tive and, thus, does not pose a double jeopardy bar to a defendant's subsequent crim-
inal prosecution.65
The Fifth Circuit advanced three reasons in support of its holding. First, the
Court asserted that the forfeiture of drug proceeds is rationally related to the costs to
government and society incurred by narcotics trafficking. The forfeiture of illegal drug
profits "serves the wholly remedial purposes of reimbursing the government" for the
detection, investigation and prosecution of drug dealers, and society for health care
costs and lost worker productivity.'
59. Id.
60. Id. at 20-21.
61. 13 F.3d 1493 (11th cir. 1994).
62. Id. at 1499.
63. Id.
64. 18 F.3d 295 (5th cir. 1994).
65: Id. at 298-99.
66. Id. at 299.
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Second, the Court posited that the logic of Austin is inapplicable to § 881(a)(6)
drug proceeds cases. The Court correctly observed that Austin dealt only with whether
forfeitures under §§ 881 (a)(4)-involving conveyances and other means of transporting
drugs-and (a)(7)--real property used to facilitate drug trafficking-"constituted pun-
ishment under the Excessive Fines Clause."67 The Austin Court did not have occasion
to address whether forfeiture of drug profits constitutes punishment. The Fifth Circuit
opined that the Supreme Court's ruling that forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)
constitutes punishment was based in large part on the Court's finding that conveyances
and real estate have no proportional relationship to the harm inflicted upon the govern-
ment and society. The Tilley court observed that forfeiture of drug proceeds will al-
ways be directly proportional to the amount of drugs sold. "The more drugs sold, the
more proceeds that will be forfeited," and proceeds "are roughly proportional to the
harm inflicted upon the government and society by the drug sale."'
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit equated the forfeiture of illicit proceeds with the seizure
of proceeds from a bank robbery. Instead of punishing the forfeiting party, confiscation
of the stolen money from a bank robber "merely places that party in the lawfully pro-
tected financial status quo that he enjoyed prior to launching his illegal scheme."
The Fifth Circuit stressed that this is not punishment "within the plain meaning of the
word.
, ,70
3. The Restrictive View
In United States v. $405,089.23 in U.S. Currency, the Ninth Circuit adopted a
restrictive view, finding that a subsequent civil forfeiture action always violates double
jeopardy. 7' In $405,089.23 in U.S. Currency, the Ninth Circuit considered a double
jeopardy challenge to a civil forfeiture of drug proceeds filed under § 881(a)(6) pro-
ceeding the defendants' convictions on narcotics charges. The defendants were indicted
on various counts of narcotics trafficking and money laundering. Five days later, the
government instituted a civil forfeiture action against several hundred thousand dollars
of property, including the following: a $405,089.23 bank account; $8,929.93 in three
bank accounts; $123,000 in cash; 138 silver bars; a helicopter; an airplane; two boats
and eleven automobiles.72 The government argued "that the property was forfeitable
on two independent grounds: as proceeds of illegal narcotics transactions and as prop-
erty involved in money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A). ' 73 The defendants
were subsequently convicted of the criminal charge. Eight months later, the govern-
ment moved for summary judgment in the parallel civil forfeiture action, relying in
large part on the defendants' criminal convictions to establish probable cause.74 The
district court granted the government's motion and ordered the entire res forfeited.
67. Id. at 300.
68. Id. at 300.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989)). The Ninth Circuit in United
States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489, 495 (9th Cir. 1994), indicated that the dou-
ble jeopardy dilemma can be avoided by predicating the civil forfeiture on some offense other than the
offenses for which the defendant has been tried criminally.
71. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994).
72. Id. at 1214.
73. Id. at 1214.
74. Id. at 1214.
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The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the government violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause by obtaining criminal convictions and then continuing to pursue a
civil action. 5 The Court based its conclusion on two reasons. First, the Court con-
cluded that the criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture action subjected the claimants
to separate proceedings in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Ninth Circuit
explicitly rejected the view espoused by the Second and Eleventh Circuits in Millan76
and 18755 North Bay Road." The Ninth Circuit did not agree that "two separate ac-
tions, one civil and one criminal, instituted at different times, tried at different times
before different fact finders, presided over by different district court judges, and re-
solved by separate judgments, constitute the same 'proceeding."'' 8 The Court posited
that civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution would constitute the same proceeding only
if they were brought in the same indictment and tried at the same time.79
Secondly, the Court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's holding in United States v.
Tilley, which said that forfeiture of drug proceeds does not constitute punishment. 0 In
analyzing the issue, the Court refused to apply a case-by-case approach to determine
whether forfeiture of proceeds is so excessive in relation to any remedial goal that it
must be construed as "punishment." Instead, the Ninth Circuit read Austin as mandat-
ing an abstract, "categorical" approach to determining whether a civil forfeiture is
punitive:
Under Austin, in order to determine whether a forfeiture constitutes 'punishment,'
we must look to the entire scope of the statute which the government seeks to
employ, rather than to the characteristics of the specific property the government
seeks to forfeit .... [T]he Austin Court explicitly refused to apply ... a case-by-
case approach to determining whether a forfeiture constitutes 'punishment.' 8'
Under this categorical approach, the Ninth Circuit indicated that it must look at
the characteristics of the forfeiture statute rather than the characteristics of the property
forfeited. 2 In examining § 881(a)(6) as a whole, the Court determined that it was not
limited to the forfeiture of proceeds, which arguably is remedial, but instead encom-
passed all money furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for
a controlled substance, as well as to any money used or intended to be used to facili-
tate any violation of this subchapter.83 The Court observed: "Rather than rendering
only the profits of drug dealers subject to forfeiture, the statute applies to nearly any
75. Id. at 1214.
76. 2 F.3d at 17.
77. 13 F.3d 1493.
78. 33 F.3d at 1216.
79. Id. at 1216.
80. 33 F.3d at 1220 (citing United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1994).
81. 33 F.3d at 1220. The Ninth Circuit misconstrued the meaning of Austin. In Austin, the Su-
preme Court adopted a categorical approach for determining whether forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and
(a)(7) was excessive because it found the relationship between the actual costs incurred by the govem-
ment and the amount of the sanction (the value of the mobile trailer and auto body shop) to be pure-
ly coincidental. In other words, the Supreme Court found no "rational relation" between the forfeiture
and any losses incurred by the government. In contrast, in the case of drug proceeds there is a "ratio-
nal relation" between the forfeiture of drug profits and the quantity of drugs distributed, as well as the
harm caused to society. Accordingly, the reasons advanced by the Supreme Court in Austin for adopt-
ing a categorical approach in §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) cases, do not necessarily apply in § 881(a)(6)
drug proceeds cases.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1221 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988) (emphasis added by the Court)).
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money that is involved in a narcotics transaction in some fashion."" Thus, the Court
concluded that the forfeiture statute at issue does not solely serve a remedial purpose.
Because the civil forfeiture statute in the abstract permits the imposition of punish-
ment, the Court held that the forfeiture is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 5
The federal circuits have thus embraced widely divergent views of Austin and
whether civil forfeiture and criminal prosecution for the conduct giving rise to the
forfeiture offend the protections afforded under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Depend-
ing on the particular jurisdiction, the government runs the risk that by obtaining a
judgment of civil forfeiture it may be subsequently barred on double jeopardy grounds
from pursuing criminal prosecution of the owner of the tainted property. 6 The court's
ruling on the double jeopardy issue may thus reap an unexpected windfall for the
defendant, either immunizing him from prosecution for the offense upon which the
prior forfeiture was based or, if prosecuted criminally, protecting his illegally acquired
property from subsequent forfeiture.87
At the same time, whether the defendant's double jeopardy rights are offended
may turn fortuitously on where the defendant is prosecuted or where the civil forfeiture
action is filed. For example, civil forfeiture of narcotics proceeds will survive a consti-
tutional challenge if the suit is filed in the Fifth Circuit, under that court's decision in
United States v. Tilley." In contrast, the same civil forfeiture action, if filed in the
Ninth Circuit, will be deemed punitive, imposing multiple punishment in violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. On the other hand, if the criminal prosecution and civil
suit are brought simultaneously, regardless of the nature of the property subject to
forfeiture, the judicial proceedings may be viewed as "a single, coordinated prosecu-
tion," and the government may withstand a double jeopardy challenge.' The Ninth
Circuit does not recognize this legal fiction and a forfeiture action and criminal prose-
cution would constitute the "same" proceeding only if brought in the same indictment
and tried at the same time.9'
The current status of the law, as it relates to civil forfeiture and double jeopardy
jurisprudence, is contradictory, confusing and has resulted in inconsistent rulings by the
federal circuits. 92 The Department of Justice has filed a petition for writ of certiorari
0
84. Id. at 1221.
85. Id. at 1222.
86. See Ragin v. United States, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9005; ("jeopardy attaches when final
judgment of forfeiture is entered and not when the claim or answer is filed or the property is
seized"). Three circuits hold that jeopardy does not attach in an uncontested administrative civil forfei-
ture action. See United States v. Baird, _ F.3d __, United States v. Cretacci, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
20618 (9th Cir.); United States v. Tones, 28 F.3d 1463, 1466 (7th Cir. 1994).
87. At least one circuit has recognized that in order to implicate double jeopardy protections, the
criminal prosecution and civil forfeiture action must be based upon the "same offense." See United
States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no double jeopardy
violation where criminal conviction was for conspiracy to import marijuana and hashish and judgment
of civil forfeiture was based upon currency transaction violation); See also U.S. v. Chick, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 17041 (9th Cir.).
88. Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300.
89. See United States v. $405,089.23 in U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1214.
90. See United States v. 18755 North Bay Road, 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
91. See 33 F.3d at 1216.
92. See United States v. $69,292.00 in U.S. Currency, 1995 WL 461884 (9th Cir.)(Forfeiture of
funds for failing to report the export of monetary instruments in excess of $10,000.00 constitutes pun-
ishment for purposes of double jeopardy).
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with the Supreme Court in United States v. $405,089.23 in U.S. Currency, in order to
reconcile these inconsistent federal circuit holdings.93 On certiorari, the Supreme
Court should address whether under Halper, the forfeiture of drug proceeds is remedi-
al, or instead, constitutes punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The Court should also consider whether Austin mandates the "categorical"
approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in $405,089.23 in U.S. Currency in drug proceeds
cases, rather than a case-by-case analysis of the property forfeited. Additionally, the
Court should resolve whether the legal fiction, that criminal and civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings brought simultaneously (even though filed separately) constitute "a single,
coordinated prosecution," created by the Second and Eleventh Circuits in Millan and
18755 North Bay Road, is consistent with the protections afforded under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
B. The Innocent Owner Defense
The Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue has like-
wise been controversial and has created a split in the circuits.94 The decision is signif-
icant for two reasons. First, the Court held that the innocent owner defense is not
limited to bona fide purchasers." Accordingly, a donee, someone who paid no value
and received the tainted property as a gift, can claim the defense. Second, the Supreme
Court opined that the innocent owner defense trumps the relation-back doctrine.96
Thus, a donee who was without knowledge or did not consent to the property being
used for criminal purposes holds a superior title over the government.
The Court's holding in 92 Buena Vista Avenue has given added importance to
whether the language of the innocent owner defense "without knowledge or consent"
should be construed in the disjunctive or the conjunctive. If interpreted disjunctively, to
require that the owner only demonstrate he lacked either knowledge or consent, a post-
offense transferee could prevail over the government even if he had knowledge at the
time of the transfer that the property was tainted, but did not consent to the illegal
activity. This would enable a defendant to avoid civil forfeiture entirely by simply
transferring his ill-gotten gains to a third-party who had knowledge of the origins of
the property, but did not consent to the defendant trafficking in narcotics. Since the
post-illegal act transferee would qualify as an innocent owner, the property would be
immunized from civil forfeiture. Moreover, the post-illegal act transferee will almost
always be able to satisfy the lack of consent requirement to qualify as an innocent
owner. Since the post-illegal act transferee had no interest in or control over the prop-
erty prior to its receipt, there would be no reason for him to consent or withhold his
consent to the illegal acts supporting the forfeiture. The post-illegal act transferee
would therefore always qualify as an innocent owner and hold superior title over the
government.97
93. United States v. $145,139.00, 18 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1994) (the Second Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion, finding that money was instrumentality of the crime).
94. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
95. Id. at 1134.
96. Id. at 1136-37. The relation-back doctrine provides that the government's interest vests after
the offense giving rise to forfeiture. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(h).
97. The requirements to qualify as an innocent owner under the criminal forfeiture provision are
much more demanding. To qualify as an innocent owner under 21 U.S.C. § 853(c), the criminal forfei-
ture statute, a third-party claimant must demonstrate that he is a bona fide purchaser for value and
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in 92 Buena Vista Avenue, a number of
federal circuits adopted the disjunctive interpretation of the "without knowledge or
consent" language. These included the First Circuit in United States v. 77 Walnut
St.,9 the Second Circuit in United States v. 141st Corp. By Hersh,99 the Third Cir-
cuit in United States v. 6109 Grubb Road,"" and the Eleventh Circuit in United
States v. 1012 Germantown Road."' These cases all involved pre-illegal act owners,
as compared to post-illegal act transferees. Prior to 92 Buena Vista Avenue, it was pre-
sumed that a post-illegal act transferee could never raise the innocent owner defense
because the relation-back provision vested title in the government at the time of the
illegal act and, thus, a post-illegal act transferee could never be an owner." 2 The
Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to embrace the conjunctive interpretation. 3 The dis-
positive question is, therefore, whether the circuits that adopted a disjunctive reading of
the statute prior to 92 Buena Vista Avenue will continue to construe the innocent own-
er defense in the disjunctive when applied to post-illegal act transferees.
Since the Court's ruling in 92 Buena Vista Avenue, three circuits have addressed
the disjunctive-conjunctive issue. The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits have construed the
statute in the conjunctive, finding innocence incompatible with knowledge of the illegal
acts giving rise to forfeiture. In United States v. 6640 SW 48th Street, the Eleventh
Circuit explicitly rejected claimant's argument that he was an innocent owner, while
conceding knowledge, because he did not consent. " The Eleventh Circuit posited
that is must interpret § 881(a)(7) so as to give it a logical meaning which is not at
odds with its purpose and avoid an absurd result. The Court observed that a post-ille-
was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture. Section 853(c)
provides:
All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in the United
States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. Any
such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may
be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited
to the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection
(n) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of pur-
chase was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture
under this section.
98. 923 F.2d 840 (1st Cir. 1990) (claimant raising innocent owner defense under § 881(a)(7)
entitled to judgment by proving "that the illegal use of the property occurred either without her knowl-
edge or without her consent").
99. 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990) ("We conclude that a claimant may avoid forfeiture by
establishing either that he had no knowledge of the narcotics activity or, if he had knowledge, that he
did not consent to it.").
100. 886 F.2d 618, 624 (3d Cir. 1989) ("knowledge of the illegal usage does not deprive the own-
er of an interest when the owner can demonstrate the property was used without her consent").
101. 963 F.2d 1496, 1503 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[E]ither ignorance or non-consent is sufficient to
make out an innocent owner defense."). But see United States v. 6960 Miraflores Ave., 995 F.2d 1558
(1lth Cir. 1993) (following a conjunctive application).
102. See United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 801 (3d Cir. 1994).
103. See United States v. Lot 111-B, Tax Map Key, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam).
104. 41 F.3d 1448, 1453 (1995). The Eleventh Circuit also recognized the intra-circuit split regard-
ing whether the innocent owner defense should be construed in the disjunctive or conjunctive. See
United States v. 1012 Germantown Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1500 (1lth Cir. 1992) (interpreting the statute
in the disjunctive); United States v. 6960 Miraflores Avenue, 995 F.2d 1558, 1564 (1lth Cir. 1993)
(interpreting the statute in the conjunctive); United States v. 15603 85th Avenue North, 933 F.2d 976,
981 (lth Cir. 1991) (adopting a conjunctive application). The Court stated that it need not resolve
this intra-circuit split at this time because those cases involved pre-illegal act owners. Id. at 1452.
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gal act transferee would always be able to show lack of consent if he had no legal
interest in or control of the property at the time of the occurrence of the illegal
acts."5 The Court opined that to construe the statute in the disjunctive would "create
a sweeping grant of immunity from forfeiture and a gaping hole in an intentionally
comprehensive forfeiture statute."" Thus, the Court held that a post-illegal act trans-
feree cannot rely on the consent prong of the innocent owner defense."°7
In United States v. 10936 Oak Run Circle, the Ninth Circuit vacated a judgment
of forfeiture based on the Supreme Court's decision in 92 Buena Vista Avenue and re-
manded the case to determine whether the claimant had knowledge of the previous
owner's drug activities when he acquired an interest in the real property.0 8 The
Ninth Circuit held that the statute bars an owner with knowledge that the property was
acquired with drug proceeds from asserting the innocent owner defense."° The Court
commented "that innocence is incompatible with knowledge that puts the owner on
notice that he should inquire further.""0
In contrast, the Third Circuit reached the opposite conclusion. In United States v.
One 1973 Rolls Royce, the Third Circuit construed the innocent owner defense in the
disjunctive and vacated an order forfeiting a Rolls Royce that had been given to a
prominent Philadelphia defense lawyer by Nicodemo Scarfo, Sr., the former reputed
boss of the Philadelphia branch of the La Cosa Nostra."' The Rolls Royce had been
given as repayment for $16,000 paid by the attorney to cover the costs of a lavish
party given by Scarfo's son to celebrate the elder Scarfo's acquittal at a murder trial
where the attorney served as one of the defense counsel." 2 The government seized
the Rolls Royce contending that it was used to shuttle people to and from meetings
conducted as part of the Scarfo family's drug distribution business, and, therefore,
facilitated narcotics activity.' '3 The attorney filed a claim maintaining he was an in-
nocent owner because he did not consent to the use of the Rolls Royce in connection
with drug transactions.
In a two-member panel majority decision, the Third Circuit held that the claimant
qualified as an innocent owner because he did not consent to the criminal acts support-
ing forfeiture. The Court cited its earlier decision in 6109 Grubb Road, where it con-
105. Id. at 1472.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 9 F.3d 74 (1993).
109. 6640 SW 48th St., 41 F.3d at 1453 n. 13. The Southern District of Michigan has also adopt-
ed this approach. See United States v. Certain Real Property (S.D. Mich. June 8, 1994) (An inquiry
into consent is "not appropriate ... where a claimant acquired the property after the illegal activity
took place").
110. 10936 Oak Run Circle, 9 F.3d at 76. Claimants maintained that Edwards (the purported drug
dealer) was romantically involved with their daughter and they loaned him $6,000 on one occasion and
forgave a $5,000 debt on another occasion. Claimants contended that they agreed to cancel the
$11,000 debt and to assume the mortgage on the forfeited property if Edwards transferred the property
to them. It was uncontradicted that the property was worth at least $190,000 with an outstanding mort-
gage of $102,000. Id. at 75. The Court characterized this as a remarkable bargain and on remand
directed that the district court inquire why Edwards would give them such a bargain and whether they
inquired why. Id. at 76.
111. United States v. Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794 (3rd Cir. 1994).
112. Id. at 799. Scarfo had been tried for the murder of Salvatore Testa, who had been the boss
of the Philadelphia La Cosa Nostra. Scarfo was his "consigliere" at the time. Scarfo was subsequently
acquitted of Testa's murder.
113. Id. at 799-800.
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strued the "knowledge or consent" language in the disjunctive in a pre-illegal act own-
er case, involving forfeiture under § 881(a)(7)." 4 The Court acknowledged the prob-
lem created by this interpretation of the innocent owner defense in post-illegal act
transferee cases. The Court observed that a post-illegal act transferee, aware of the
property's taint could benefit from the defense. Moreover, the disjunctive construction
"creates the problem of insulating certain owners who one reasonably might not con-
sider to be deserving.""'
The Court considered the possibility of limiting the disjunctive application of the
defense as mandated in 6109 Grubb Road to pre-illegal act owners and applying the
statute conjunctively in post-illegal act cases. However, it rejected this application of
the statute, which it characterized as an act of "judicial legislation," finding instead that
the statute simply draws no distinction between pre-illegal act owners and post-illegal
act transferees." 6 Recognizing the ambiguity in the statutory language and finding
that the statute is punitive in nature, the Court reasoned that the rule of lenity applies.
It requires that any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the claimant."7 Further-
more, the Court attempted to support its decision by citing to dicta in 92 Buena Vista
Avenue (which actually weighs against the majority's ruling)"' and quoting from Jus-
tice Scalia's concurrence which suggests that protecting post-illegal act transferees
from forfeiture would not necessarily lead to an absurd result.' '
Finally, the Third Circuit opined that the statutory construction problem arises
not from the 92 Buena Vista Avenue decision or the Court's interpretation of the stat-
ute in 6109 Grubb Road, but rather that "the problem originated in Congress when it
failed to draft a statute that takes into account the substantial differences between those
owners who own the property during the improper use and some of those who acquire
it afterwards."' 2 The Court strongly admonished Congress to redraft the statute.
Circuit Judge Nygaard authored a highly critical dissenting opinion. He charac-
terized the majority opinion as "more an act of judicial abdication than judicial re-
straint" and stated that the court is obligated to construe the statute in a manner that
avoids a result that contradicts its purpose."' In his view, the majority's reading of
the statute contravenes the very purpose of promulgating § 881, which is to curb drug
activity."' Moreover, Judge Nygaard maintained that neither 92 Buena Vista Avenue
114. id. at 801-02.
115. Id. at 818.
116. Id. at 818.
117. Id. at 819.
118. The plurality in Buena Vista Avenue suggested that equitable principles (not the statutory
language) might prevent a post-illegal act transferee with knowledge of the illegal act from having the
benefit of the innocent owner defense. The Court ultimately avoided this issue by stating that respon-
dent has assumed the burden of convincing the trier of fact that she had no knowledge of the alleged
source of [the property]." 113 S. Ct. 1126 at 1137.
119. United States v. Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d at 819. The Third Circuit engages in a disingenuous
argument when it states that the principal goal of §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) was to give owners of prop-
erty an incentive to prevent use of their property in the drug trade. The Court contends that because
post-illegal act transferees were not in a position to prevent the improper use of the property at the
time, punishing those owners would do little to accomplish the purpose of the statutes. Rather, the
primary intent of Congress was to deprive drug traffickers of their illicit proceeds. Moreover, this
purpose would be served by forfeiting property transferred to a third party with knowledge of its ille-
gal origin where the intent of the transferor was to evade forfeiture by the government. Id.
120. Id. at 820.




nor 6109 Grubb Road apply to post-illegal act transferees and, therefore, are not dis-
positive of the instant case.23
The Third Circuit's decision in One 1973 Rolls Royce has, thus, created an intol-
erable split in the circuits. In light of the inconsistent application of the innocent owner
defense by the federal courts, any proposed legislative reform must confront the pre-
illegal act versus the post-illegal act dilemma. The defendant should not be permitted
to immunize his property from forfeiture by simply transferring it to a third-party.
Furthermore, as the Ninth Circuit indicated in United States v. 10936 Oak Run Circle,
"innocence is incompatible with knowledge."' 24 If a post-illegal act transferee has
knowledge that the property was acquired' with drug proceeds, he should not qualify as
an innocent owner.
Any legislative amendments to the innocent owner defense should distinguish
between a pre-illegal act owner and post-illegal act transferee. In addressing the re-
quirements for a pre-illegal act owner, if the pre-illegal act owner was without knowl-
edge that his property was being used for an illegal purpose, since he did not engage
in and was not aware of any wrongdoing, it would be unfair to punish him by forfeit-
ing his property. Moreover, since he could not consent without first having knowledge,
it would not be necessary to prove lack of consent. Proof of lack of knowledge would
end the inquiry. On the other hand, if the owner had knowledge, he should then be
required to prove lack of consent. Furthermore, lack of consent should be construed to
mean that the claimant took all reasonable steps to prevent his property from being
used illegally."z The pre-illegal act owner should not be permitted to qualify as an
innocent owner if he had knowledge and took no action to prevent the unlawful con-
duct, in effect, permitting his property to be used for an illegal purpose. Only if the
pre-illegal act owner can show that he took all reasonable efforts to prevent the illegal
conduct could he prevail as an innocent owner.
With regards to the post-illegal act transferee, the consent requirement is rather
meaningless since prior to acquiring the property the post-illegal act transferee has no
interest in or control over the property and therefore no reason to withhold his consent.
In the case of a post-illegal act transferee, the testfor innocent owner should simply be
knowledge. If the post-illegal act transferee has knowledge at the time of the transfer
that the property was derived from illicit activity or was used to facilitate prohibited
criminal conduct, the post-illegal act transferee should not qualify as an innocent own-
er. The government should prevail against a post-illegal act transferee with guilty
knowledge. This construction of the statute would prevent sham transfers of property
intended to avoid forfeiture and further comport with the intent of Congress, which is
to deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gains. Moreover, where the post-illegal act
transferee acquires the property with guilty knowledge, forfeiture of the property does
not violate principles of equity. The post-illegal act transferee should have suspected
that his possession of tainted property could be subject to legal challenge at a later
time. By analogy, the situation is similar to a person who purchases stolen property at
an unreasonably low price. Under the law, the purchaser is deemed to have construc-
tive knowledge and not only is he not permitted to retain the property, but may himself
123. Id.
124. 41 F.3d at 1453 n. 13.
125. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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be guilty of receipt of stolen property. A person who knowingly receives drug pro-
ceeds or property believed to be purchased with illicit narcotics proceeds is no less
guilty of wrongdoing than the person who receives stolen property. The post-illegal act
transferee with knowledge should not be entitled to protection under the innocent own-
er defense.
V. CONCLUSION
Civil forfeiture is a potent weapon in the war against drugs and international
narcotics trafficking. If the government is to wage a successful assault on organized
drug trafficking, it must continue to strike at the economic base of criminal enterprises
and deprive its members of their illicit profits. On the other hand, because of the civil
nature of the proceedings and the application of the less demanding standard of proof
in civil forfeiture cases, there remains the potential for abuse. The problem is further
aggravated when local law enforcement agencies stand to directly benefit and profit
from the seized property. Accordingly, civil forfeiture is the subject of strong com-
peting interests and concerns.
There is currently federal legislation which considers scaling back the reach of
civil forfeiture. At the same time, recent Supreme Court decisions have recognized the
punitive aspects of civil forfeiture and limited the application of civil forfeiture. In
Austin v. United States, the Supreme Court held that civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. §
881 (a)(4) and (a)(7) constitutes punishment and, thus, is limited by the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. While the Court in United States v. 92 Buena
Vista Avenue, concluded that an innocent donee qualifies as an innocent owner and as
between the government and an innocent owner, the latter should prevail.
These recent Supreme Court rulings, however, have divided the federal circuits
and resulted in inconsistent holdings by the courts. In certain instances, these decisions
have severely weakened the civil forfeiture laws by interpreting the "innocent owner"
defense so as to enable the defendant to immunize property from forfeiture by
transferring it to a person with guilty knowledge. In other cases, the federal circuits
have construed the Double Jeopardy Clause to immunize from criminal prosecution
individuals who have been subject to a prior judgment of civil forfeiture. Furthermore,
where the defendant has been criminally prosecuted, the courts have held that because
civil forfeiture constitutes punishment in every case, double jeopardy prohibits a subse-
quent civil forfeiture suit. Finally, it is clear that the proposed legislation by
Representatives Hyde and Conyers fails to take into consideration the import of these
recent Supreme Court forfeiture decisions. Consequently, in an effort to reform civil
forfeiture, there is a real danger that the proposed civil forfeiture bills will further
dilute the effectiveness of civil forfeiture as a prosecutorial weapon against narcotics
trafficking. For instance, the Hyde Bill would have the effect of codifying the Third
Circuit's construction of the innocent owner defense in United States v. One 1973
Rolls Royce, where the court vacated an order of forfeiture because the post-illegal act
transferee did not consent to the criminal activity supporting forfeiture. Thus, before
the enactment of civil forfeiture reform legislation, there remain numerous issues that
need to be resolved and the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on forfeiture
must be fully considered. It is furthermore imperative that the Supreme Court grant
certiorari in United States v. $405,089.23 in U.S. Currency and United States v. One
1973 Rolls Royce, or some other appropriate case, to resolve the legal issues that di-
vide the federal circuits on the issue of double jeopardy.

